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The Maurice Clarett Story:                    
A Justice System Failure 
Alan C. Milstein* 
The Maurice Clarett (“Clarett”) story is emblematic of what is 
wrong with the National Collegiate Athletic Association’s 
(“NCAA”) arbitrary and unjust enforcement process.  It 
demonstrates how a life that held such promise was laid to waste 
by the NCAA’s unholy alliance with the National Football League 
(“NFL”)—a league that keeps young men toiling at grave risk and 
for no pay in a plantation system known as college football.  It is 
also a personal story about a case that should have been won, but 
whose loss keeps getting me invited to symposiums like this.  To 
quote Bob Dylan:  “[T]here is no success like failure, and that 
failure is no success at all.”1 
Maurice Clarett was born in Youngstown, Ohio, where he 
attended Warren G. Harding High School.  Raised by his single 
 
* Shareholder and Chairman of the Litigation Department at Sherman, 
Silverstein, Kohl, Rose & Podolsky, P.A.  The author represented Maurice 
Clarett in Clarett v. NFL, 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004).  The author received 
his J.D., with honors, from Temple University School of Law; his M.A. from 
the University of Kansas; and his B.A. from the University of Maryland.  
This Article is derived from the author’s speech at Roger Williams University 
School of Law on March 21, 2014 and from the briefs filed in Clarett, which 
were prepared with the assistance of Daniel Allanoff, Michael McCann, and 
Robert McCormack. 
 1.  BOB DYLAN, Love Minus Zero/No Limit, on BRINGING IT ALL BACK 
HOME (Columbia Records 1965). 
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mother, Clarett and his older brother faced tough times in a tough 
neighborhood.  When his older brother ended up with a lengthy 
prison term, Clarett was determined to live a different life.  His 
way out was based on his ability to do one thing remarkably well: 
carry an odd shaped ball at blazing speed around, and sometimes 
through, others trying to stop him. 
While in high school, Clarett became a nationally known 
football player, receiving many accolades, including being named 
the USA Today Offensive Player of the Year as a senior and 
chosen as “Mr. Football” by the Associated Press.2  Clarett 
graduated high school on December 11, 2001, two-thirds of the 
way through the 2001 NFL season.  Subsequently, he enrolled in 
classes at Ohio State University in January 2002 in order to 
attend spring football practice.3  He seemed destined for 
greatness.4 
On August 24, 2002, Clarett became the first true-freshman 
tailback to start a football game for the Buckeyes since 1943.5  
Ohio State beat Texas Tech that day by a score of forty-five to 
twenty-one, and Clarett rushed for 175 yards and scored three 
touchdowns.6  Texas Tech’s free safety Ryan Aycock commented 
on a particular play:  “He might have been 18 but he knew what 
he was doing . . . That’s when you knew he’d be great.  Not many 
guys his age have the heart to keep fighting once they’re 
stopped.”7 
With Clarett leading the way, Ohio State achieved rousing 
success during the 2002-2003 college football season.  Clarett 
rushed for an Ohio State freshman record of 1,237 yards and 
scored eighteen touchdowns, despite missing two games with 
 
 2.  See Craig Smith, Ohio State back makes big splash, SEATTLE TIMES 
(Sept. 12, 2002), http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date= 
20020912&slug=coug12.  
 3.  See Billy Witz, Battle for the Ages Ensues in NFL, DAILY NEWS (Dec. 
14, 2003), available at http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P2-9034215.html.  
 4.  See Michael A. McCann, Justice Sotomayor and the Relationship 
between Leagues and Players: Insights and Implications, 42 CONN. L. REV. 
901, 910–12 (2010). 
 5.  See Road to the Title, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Jan. 5, 2003, at S2, 
available at 2003 WLNR 524692. 
 6.  See id. 
 7.  Luke Cyphers, Call Waiting, ESPN INSIDER (Sept. 19, 2003, 11:35 
PM), http://insider.espn.go.com/insider/story?id=1619403.  
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injuries.8  Ohio State went undefeated during the regular 
season—winning thirteen straight games—and awaited a date in 
Arizona with the vaunted Miami Hurricanes to compete for the 
national title.9 
Just prior to the Fiesta Bowl, however, Clarett’s roots 
resurfaced when a close friend died in a gang related shooting.10  
Clarett told Coach Jim Tressel (“Tressel”) that he needed to attend 
the funeral.  The school’s Athletic Director, Andy Geiger 
(“Geiger”), assured Clarett and his mother that the University 
would fly him back to Youngstown after a week of practice in 
Arizona.11  However, when it came time for the sad trip home, the 
Buckeyes reneged, telling Clarett that he had failed to complete 
the proper paperwork.12  Clarett publicly expressed his outrage at 
a news conference, essentially labeling Geiger a liar and uttering 
words that, to the Buckeye faithful, was surely sacrilege:  “I guess 
football is more important than a person’s life to them.”13 
Ohio State defeated the University of Miami in the Fiesta 
Bowl and won the national championship, its first title in thirty-
four years.14  Though not named the game’s MVP, Clarett scored 
the winning touchdown and made a game saving defensive play, 
forcing a fumble following an interception that almost sealed the 
win for the Hurricanes.15 
Back at school for the spring semester, Clarett enrolled in 
Paulette Pierce’s African American History course.  Professor 
Pierce had heard the stories of Buckeye football players being 
 
 8.  See Liz Clarke, Buckeyes put Clarett on Hold; Running Back Won’t be 
Allowed to Practice, WASH. POST (Sept. 3, 2003), available at http:// 
www.highbeam.com/ doc/1P2-280646.html.  
 9.  See id. 
 10.  See Associated Press, Clarett angered at decision forcing him to miss 
funeral, CBS SPORTS (Dec. 30, 2002) [hereinafter Clarett Funeral Cover], 
available at http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/814334/posts?page=62. 
 11.  See id.  
 12.  See William C. Rhoden, Paying the Price While Coaches Cash In, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 9, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/09/sports/ncaa 
football/09rhoden.html.  
 13.  Clarett Funeral Cover, supra note 10; see also McCann, supra note 4, 
at 910. 
 14.  See National Champions, MICHIGAN VS. OHIO STATE, http://library. 
osu.edu/projects/OSUvsMichigan/national_titles.html (last visited Dec. 29, 
2014).  
 15.  See Bruce Hooley, Dot the “i” in Title, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Jan. 
4, 2003, at D1, available at 2003 WLNR 523982. 
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given tutors who would write papers for the players and feed them 
answers to exams, and she would have none of it.  She told the 
freshman she wanted him in her office early every Monday 
morning to discuss his assignments and would proceed to give him 
an oral final exam.  According to Clarett, she was the only 
professor at Ohio State who cared about his academics, not his 
touchdowns. 
No one quite knows the exact source, but someone at Ohio 
State contacted the New York Times that summer and told a tale 
of how Maurice Clarett received special treatment in Professor 
Pierce’s class.16  On July 12, 2003, Mike Freeman, a sportswriter 
for the Times who later resigned because of discrepancies in his 
curriculum vitale, published a multi-column article that exposed, 
in his perception, outrageous academic corruption.17  Always 
vigilant, the NCAA’s enforcement arm sprung into action. 
In August, Clarett was summoned to Geiger’s office where, 
without notice, counsel, or even a parent, he was questioned for 
more than an hour by an NCAA enforcement officer.  The subject 
of favorable treatment in the classroom was soon dismissed.  What 
really interested the NCAA was how Clarett, a poor kid from 
Youngstown, could drive around in a new SUV.  Clarett had 
received the vehicle on loan from a local car dealer who was 
friendly with Tressel, a fact Clarett would not reveal out of loyalty 
to his coach.  When the NCAA demanded a second interview, a 
friend of Clarett called and asked if I could help.  I showed up at 
Geiger’s office with Clarett’s mother and Hall of Famer Jim 
Brown, a hero in Ohio and Clarett’s mentor.  For most of the 
session, the three of us were locked out of the “proceedings” as 
Clarett was again drilled for more than an hour.  When they 
finally let us in, we were not allowed to participate, resulting in 
Brown uttering the quintessential legal argument: “This is 
bullshit!” 
 
 16.  See Mike Freeman, When Values Collide:  Clarett Got Unusual Aid 
in Ohio State Class, N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2003/07/13/sports/colleges-when-values-collide-clarett-got-unusual-aid-in-ohio 
-state-class.html.  
 17.  See id.  Freeman resigned from the New York Times after 
acknowledging that he did not graduate from the University of Delaware, as 
he had previously claimed.  See Howard Kurtz, Puffed-up Resume Costs 
Sportswriter a New Job, WASH. POST (Jan. 10, 2004), available at http://www. 
highbeam.com/doc/1P2-148948.html.  
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An often-misunderstood quirk in NCAA enforcement actions 
is that the NCAA has no jurisdiction over and cannot sanction 
players.18  Its authority is limited to the schools within the 
NCAA.19  However, if the school fails to sanction the offending 
player, the NCAA will sanction the school.20  The result is a 
system that leaves the player with limited appeal rights since the 
investigative body takes no action.  For Clarett, this meant that 
Geiger, the man he had called a liar, was judge and jury with the 
added incentive to throw Clarett under the bus to save his multi-
million dollar football operation.  On September 9, 2003, Geiger 
announced at a press conference that Clarett was suspended for at 
least the upcoming season, and perhaps indefinitely, for not being 
candid with the NCAA and receiving property worth over 
$20,000.00.21  No report by the NCAA was ever presented to 
Clarett.  There were no findings of fact, and there was no forum to 
which he could lodge an appeal.  No sanctions were leveled 
against the University. 
With no ability to play collegiate football, Clarett had little 
choice but to attempt to gain early access into the NFL.  Through 
channels, we had heard that if Clarett entered the draft, the 
Dallas Cowboys would take him in the first round.  The problem 
was that NFL teams had conspired to agree that no player in 
Clarett’s college class would be eligible for the draft.  Interestingly 
enough, Michigan State law professor Robert McCormack had just 
recently published an Op-Ed piece in the New York Times 
declaring the NFL’s age eligibility rule to be in violation of 
antitrust laws.22  With my close friend Dan Allanoff, an antitrust 
expert, we drafted the Complaint using Professor McCormack’s 
article as a guide.  I wrote the NFL and asked if they wanted to 
discuss the matter before we filed suit. 
 
 18.  See generally Maureen A. Weston, NCAA Sanctions: Assigning 
Blame Where it Belongs, 52 B.C.L. REV. 551 (2011). 
 19.  See generally id. 
 20.  See generally id. 
 21.  See Stephen A. Smith, Hypocrisy rules in Columbus: Ohio State 
destroys the promising future of its star running back, PHILA. INQUIRER (Sept. 
14, 2003), available at 2003 WLNR 14784315. 
 22.  See Robert A. McCormick, Open Letter to Maurice Clarett: Why You 
May Turn Professional Now, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 17, 2003), http://www. 
nytimes.com/2003/08/17/sports/backtalk-open-letter-to-maurice-clarett-why-
you-may-turn-professional-now.html.  
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On Monday, September 22, 2003, Clarett’s mother and I met 
with the NFL’s counsel to discuss Clarett’s participation in the 
April 2004 player draft, which I argued would be held after three 
NFL seasons had “elapsed” since Clarett’s high school 
graduation.23  The NFL representatives responded that the rule 
required three years to pass after the player’s class, as opposed to 
the player, graduated from high school.  While the precise 
language of the rule was not a matter of public record, the league 
denied Clarett’s request to enter the draft in order to preserve its 
rule.  We filed suit in federal district court in Manhattan the next 
day.  Two days later, Mike Freeman of the Times wrote a profile of 
me, titled Clarett’s Lawyer Sees Abuse of Power by Pro Football.24  
He neglected to recognize that I informed him that he had been 
used by Ohio State to malign Clarett in his prior academic piece. 
The case was assigned to Judge Shira Scheindlin, a Bill 
Clinton nominee.  While we had not asked for immediate 
injunctive relief, and the Complaint had still not been formally 
served, I received a call from the Judge’s clerk within three days 
of filing, summoning counsel to New York for a pretrial 
conference.  The Judge advised that the case was ripe for 
summary judgment and issued an expedited schedule with our 
briefs due at the end of October.  When the briefing was 
completed, and as we waited for a decision, Mike Freeman 
surfaced yet again, this time with a profile of Judge Scheindlin, 
titled Judge in Clarett Case will Get an NFL Education.25  He 
quoted the Judge as saying: ‘‘I don’t think I have ever watched a 
football game . . . maybe one half of one Super Bowl.  Does that 
count?’’26  Needless to say, the case was taking on a life of its own. 
Standing in the way of a successful challenge to the rule was 
a legal concept known as the “non-statutory labor exemption.”  
Under Mackey v. National Football League, later endorsed in 
 
 23.  The first season, which had begun when Clarett started his senior 
year, ended on February 4, 2002, fifty-five days after Clarett’s graduation; 
the other two seasons were played out in full. 
 24.   Mike Freeman, The Case for Clarett, N.Y. TIMES (Sep. 25, 2003), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/09/25/sports/football/25milstein.html.  
 25.  Mike Freeman, Judge in Clarett Case Will Get N.F.L. Education, 
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 11, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/12/11/sports/ 
football-judge-in-clarett-case-will-get-nfl-education.html.  
 26.  Id. (quoting Judge Shira A. Scheindlin, U.S. Dist. Ct. for the S. Dist. 
of N.Y.) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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McCourt v. California Sports, Inc.,27 this exemption for unlawful 
restraints would shelter an anticompetitive labor-management 
agreement only if each of the following elements were met: (1) the 
agreement is the product of bona fide arm’s-length bargaining; (2) 
the agreement concerns a mandatory subject of collective 
bargaining; and (3) the restraint on trade affects only the parties 
to the collective bargaining relationship.28 
Clarett would prevail if the rule failed to satisfy any one 
prong but, as the facts would demonstrate, the rule failed all 
three:  it was not bargained for; did not concern wages, hours, or 
terms and conditions of employment; and primarily affected those 
outside the bargaining unit, like Clarett. 
The NFL enjoys a monopoly over professional football.  The 
league began operating in 1920 as the American Professional 
Football Association, an unincorporated association comprised of 
member clubs, which owned and operated professional football 
teams.29  Presently, the NFL is comprised of thirty-two separately 
incorporated clubs in cities throughout the United States.30  
Representatives from each of the clubs form the NFL 
Management Committee, which performs various administrative 
functions such as organizing and scheduling games and 
promulgating rules.31  The clubs appoint a commissioner who is 
responsible for the day-to-day operations of the NFL.32 
At issue in this case was the NFL’s concerted refusal to allow 
a player to sign with an NFL team or be eligible for the draft 
unless three NFL seasons had elapsed since that player’s high 
school graduation.33  The rule appeared in the Constitution and 
Bylaws of the NFL, a document drafted and approved only by the 
NFL member teams.34  Section 12.1(E) of the Bylaws provided, 
“for college football players seeking special eligibility, at least 
three NFL seasons must have elapsed since the player was 
 
 27.  600 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir. 1979). 
 28.  543 F.2d 606, 614 (8th Cir. 1976). 
 29.  See Michael A. McCann, American Needle v. NFL:  An Opportunity to 
Reshape Sports Law, 119 YALE L. J. 726, 730 (2010). 
 30.  See id. 
 31.  See id. 
 32.  See id. 
 33.  See Clarett v. NFL, 369 F.3d 124, 125 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 34.  See id. at 127–28. 
MILSTEINFINALEDITWORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/27/2015  10:24 AM 
2015] A JUSTICE SYSTEM FAILURE 223 
graduated from high school.”35 
The rule had been in existence for fifty years, although it 
originally required the player to either complete four years of 
college, or have five NFL seasons elapse since his high school 
graduation.36  The NFL announced a different version of the rule 
to the public in a press release dated February 16, 1990.37  The 
NFL also issued a memorandum to Club Presidents, General 
Managers, and Head Coaches, which stated that “[a]pplications 
for special eligibility for the 1990 draft will be accepted only from 
college players as to whom three full college seasons have elapsed 
since their high school graduations.”38  The rule as stated in the 
Bylaws, however, referenced “NFL seasons,” not “college seasons” 
and did not include the word “full.”39  In 1997, Greg Aiello, 
director of communications for the NFL, expressed yet another 
version of the rule: “The rule is this: to be eligible for the NFL, a 
player has to have been out of high school for three years.”40 
In addition, the NFL had not enforced the rule in a consistent 
manner.  In 1964, for example, Andy Livingston, a nineteen-year-
old running back, signed a contract with the Chicago Bears after 
only one season of junior college football.41  In 1988, when there 
was a four-year requirement, the NFL allowed Craig “Ironhead” 
Heyward into the draft even though he had not yet graduated 
 
 35.  See Tom Farrey, Clarett to use NFL rule against league, ESPN (Dec. 
13, 2003, 12:12 PM), http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=1684775 
(quoting NFL BYLAW § 12.1(E)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  The NFL 
provided a copy of this document in response to Clarett’s initial Request to 
Produce, see Memorandum from NFL, available at http://www.sskrplaw. 
com/files/clarettreply.pdf (emphasis added).  
 36.  See Clarett, 369 F.3d at 126. 
 37.  See id. at 126, 128. 
 38.  Id. at 128 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 39.  Another memorandum dated October 1992 and issued to Club 
Owners, Presidents, and General Managers indicates that the Rule was 
revised to reflect the change from the four-year requirement to the current 
requirement of “three NFL seasons” in October 1992.  See id. at 127 n.7. 
 40.  Plaintiff Maurice Clarett’s Memorandum of Law in Support of His 
Motion for Summary Judgment at 6, Clarett v. NFL, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379 (No. 
03 Civ. 7441(SAS)), 2003 WL 26053422 [hereinafter Clarett’s Mot. Summ. J.] 
(citing Tim May, Two Years and Out?, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, May 4, 1997). 
 41.  See William C. Rhoden, In 1964, a Teenager Showed He Could Play, 
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/12/14/sports/sports-
of-the-times-in-1964-a-teenager-showed-he-could-play.html.  
MILSTEINFINALEDITWORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/27/2015  10:24 AM 
224 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 20:216 
from college.42  In 1989, again when there was a four-year 
requirement, the NFL allowed Barry Sanders into the draft after 
he suggested he would challenge the rule, although he was a true-
junior with only three NFL seasons having elapsed since his high 
school graduation.43  In 1991, the Arizona Cardinals selected Eric 
Swann as the sixth pick of the first round of the draft.44  Swann 
had never played college football and, at the time, only two NFL 
seasons had elapsed since his high school graduation.45 
Although the rule had been in effect since at least 1953, it was 
not until 1968 that the NFL recognized the National Football 
League Players Association (“NFLPA”) as the players’ collective 
bargaining representative.46  1968 was also the year of the first 
Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”) negotiated between the 
NFL and its players.47  Nowhere in that first agreement did the 
rule appear.  The CBA came into effect in 2003, which had been 
extended three times, was negotiated in 1993, and did not expire 
until the 2007 season.48  This agreement was comprised of 292 
pages,  sixty-one articles, appendices A through N, and 357 
sections; but, like its predecessors, it did not contain the rule.49  
Moreover, in Article III, Section I, titled “Scope of Agreement,” the 
 
 42.  See New Pittsburgh Courier Editorial Staff, Steelers take Ironhead’s 
son in first round, NEW PITTSBURGH COURIER (May 4, 2011), http:// 
newpittsburghcourieronline.com/2011/05/04/steelers-take-ironheads-son-in-
first-round/.  
 43.  See Time Wire Services, Barry Sanders Admitted to NFL Draft, L.A. 
TIMES (Apr. 4, 1989), http://articles.latimes.com/1989-04-04/sports/sp-
1132_1_barry-sanders.  
 44.  See Jess Root, Arizona Cardinals Top 10 Draft Successes: No. 3, 
Anquan Boldin, SB NATION:  REVENGE OF THE BIRDS (Apr. 21, 2011, 10:47 
AM), http://www.revengeofthebirds.com/2011/4/21/2125117/arizona-cardinals-
top-10-draft-successes-no-7-eric-swann. 
 45.  See Jeff Legwold, College Not Required to Make Grade in the NFL, 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS (Sept. 24, 2004), available at 
http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-122568371.html.  Other NFL players 
never played football in college, including Michael Lewis, Antonio Gates, 
Clinton Hart, Gene “Big Daddy” Lipscomb, Otis Sistrunk, and Cookie 
Gilchrist.  See id. 
 46.  See Jarrett Bell, Timeline of NFL Labor Disputes, USA Today (Mar. 
12, 2011, 12:36 AM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/football/nfl/2011-
03-03-nfl-labor-disputes-timeline_N.htm.  
 47.  See id. 
 48.  See id. 
 49.  See generally Michael A. McCann & Joseph S. Rosen, Legality of Age 
Restrictions in the NBA and NFL, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 731 (2006). 
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CBA contained an integration clause, stating: “This Agreement 
represents the complete understanding of the parties on all 
subjects covered herein, and there will be no change in the terms 
and conditions of this Agreement without mutual consent.”50  
Plainly then, the CBA between the NFL and the NFLPA did not 
contain, and has never contained, the rule.51 
The “NFL suggested at the scheduling conference that the 
NFLPA had nevertheless expressly agreed to the Rule by virtue of 
‘a side letter.’”52  When asked “to produce this document in 
discovery, the NFL delivered a letter dated May 6, 1993, written 
by its counsel and addressed to counsel for the NFLPA.”53  That 
letter, which attached the Bylaws containing the rule, states that  
“the attached documents are the presently existing provisions of 
the Constitution and Bylaws of the NFL referenced in Article IV, 
Section 2, of the Collective Bargaining Agreement.”54  The 
referenced CBA Article was entitled “No Suit” and provides simply 
that “neither [the NFLPA] nor any of its members will sue [the 
NFL] . . . relating to the presently existing provisions of the . . . 
Bylaws.”55  There was no reference to the rule in either the letter 
or the Article. 
Thus, rather than demonstrating that the rule was somehow 
expressly bargained over, the so-called “side letter” merely 
provided a copy of the Bylaws as to which the NFLPA had agreed 
that neither it nor any of its members would bring suit.  
Obviously, Clarett was not a member of the NFLPA, nor was he 
represented by that labor organization. 
At the time, the NFL was the only major sports organization 
that prohibited players from entering its draft until a prescribed 
period after high school graduation.  The National Basketball 
 
 50.  Clarett v. NFL, 369 F.3d 124, 127 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing NFL 
Collective Bargaining Agreement art. III, § 1 [hereinafter NFL CBA]). 
 51.   Probably as a result of the Clarett litigation, the current CBA 
contains the rule.  See NFL CBA art. VI (Aug. 4, 2011), available at 
http://nfllabor.files.wordpress.com/2010/01/collective-bargaining-agreement-
2011-2020.pdf.  
 52.  Clarett’s Mot. Summ. J., supra note 40, at 7. 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  Clarett, 369 F.3d at 128 (quoting Letter from NFL, to NFLPA (May 
6, 1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 55.  Id. (first alteration in original) (quoting NFL CBA art. IV, § 2) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Association, Major League Baseball, and the National Hockey 
League had no such restrictions.56  By virtue of the rule, the NFL 
member teams agreed with one another not to hire players until 
three NFL seasons had elapsed since the players graduated from 
high school.  Because of the NFL teams’ concerted refusal to deal 
with this segment of the talent pool, these players were absolutely 
and unreasonably restricted from competing for positions in the 
league and were unlawfully delayed or prevented from earning a 
livelihood in their chosen profession. 
By forcing prospective players to wait until three NFL 
seasons had elapsed before becoming eligible for its draft, the NFL 
was able to maintain a free and efficient “farm” system for 
developing players.  College football acts, in effect, as a minor 
league, for which the NFL incurs no expenses.  While Major 
League Baseball teams each spend an average of nine million 
dollars annually for the minor league system, the NFL teams 
spend virtually nothing on a player development system.57 
Instead, the only such costs incurred by NFL teams are for their 
scouts, to whom the NCAA grants easy and ready access.  Under 
the current system, NFL teams take no financial risks of investing 
in players while they are in college.  Indeed, if a player suffers an 
injury while in the NCAA, or does not develop as expected, which 
reduces his value or renders him unable to play professionally, the 
NFL teams lose nothing.  The NCAA is a willing partner in this 
cozy arrangement as college football generates millions of dollars 
for the schools without their having to incur the expense of player 
salaries.  Players who are otherwise able to compete with the best 
in their profession must bide their time on the farm working for 
nothing. 
For extremely talented players, like Maurice Clarett, who 
were otherwise able to compete for a position at the professional 
level, there were no comparable options.  Not only were members 
of this segment of the talent pool arbitrarily foreclosed from 
playing their trade for three seasons, they were also prevented 
during that time from enjoying the opportunity to reap other 
financial rewards attendant upon becoming a professional athlete, 
 
 56.  See McCann, supra note 4, at 911. 
 57.  See ANDREW ZIMBALIST, UNPAID PROFESSIONALS: COMMERCIALISM AND 
CONFLICT IN BIG-TIME COLLEGE SPORTS 197 (1999). 
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such as endorsements, appearance income, and other business 
opportunities.  As one respected sports economist estimated, 
valuing the cost of tuition and board and dividing it by the 
estimated number of hours dedicated to the sport, the median 
hourly wage for a college football athlete is just $7.69.58  
Moreover, if these players suffer career-ending injury while 
playing at the college level, their opportunity for financial rewards 
in football would be forever lost. 
Clarett’s predicament was even more dire than that of the 
typical college player.  He was suspended from playing college 
football for his entire sophomore season and perhaps beyond 
because of alleged NCAA violations.  Moreover, Clarett had no 
guarantee that the suspension would not carry into his junior 
season.  Thus, Clarett could not play either as an amateur in the 
NCAA or as a professional in the NFL.  He was a football player 
without a game. 
Clarett, who was six-feet tall and weighed 230 pounds, would 
have been about eight weeks shy of his twenty-first birthday at 
the start of the 2004 NFL season.  When the 2000 NFL season 
began, five players were twenty-one years old.59  During the 2001 
NFL season, seven NFL players were twenty-one years old.60  At 
the start of the 2002 NFL season, eight NFL players were twenty-
years old.61  Clinton Portis, the great running back with the 
Denver Broncos, turned twenty-one at the start of the 2002 NFL 
season.62 
The supposed purpose of the rule was to protect players who 
 
 58.  See Patrick K. Thornton, Sports Law 162 (2011). 
 59.  Players who were 21 during the 2000 NFL season include Jacoby 
Shephard (birthday August 31, 1979), Jamal Lewis (birthday August 26, 
1979), Dez White (birthday August 23, 1979), Kwame Cavil (birthday May 3, 
1979), and Deon Grant (birthday March 14, 1979).  See generally NFL.com 
(last visited Dec. 31, 2014); SI.com (last visited Dec. 31, 2014).  
 60.  Specifically, Hakim Akbar, Kendrell Bell, Michael Vick, Koren 
Robinson, Todd Heap, Dennis Norman, and Brandon Manumaleuna.  See 
generally NFL.com (last visited Dec. 31, 2014); SI.com (last visited Dec. 31, 
2014). 
 61.  Toniu Fonoti, Trev Faulk, Albert Haynesworth, Saleem Rasheed, 
Lito Sheppard, Antonio Bryant, T.J. Duckett, and Josh Robinson.  See 
generally NFL.com (last visited Dec. 31, 2014); SI.com (last visited Dec. 31, 
2014). 
 62.  See Clinton Portis Profile, NFL, www.nfl.com/players/playerpage/ 
302215 (last visited Dec. 29, 2014).  
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were not physically ready to compete against the men in the 
NFL.63  Clarett was as tall, or taller, and weighed as much, or 
more, than NFL running back legends Walter Payton, Barry 
Sanders, and Gale Sayers when they played football.64  Of the top 
twenty rushing leaders after the fifth week of the 2003 NFL 
season, Clarett weighed as much as or more than seventeen of 
them and was as tall or taller than fifteen of them.65  “In addition, 
Emmitt Smith, who has rushed for more yards than any player in 
the history of the NFL, was 20 years old when drafted in 1990, 
and weighed less and was shorter than Clarett.”66  If the purpose 
of the rule was to protect players not physically mature enough to 
play in the pros, it had no logical application or connection to 
Clarett.  In addition, a rule designed to safeguard against 
physically immature players could have been accomplished by far 
better means—such as, most obviously, a rule requiring certain 
height, weight, and strength to play in the NFL. 
On February 5, 2004, Judge Scheindlin issued her opinion 
finding in favor of Clarett.67  The Judge began by stating that 
“Clarett’s challenge to the Rule raises serious questions arising at 
the intersection of labor law and antitrust law, not to mention the 
intersection of college football and professional football.”68  In 
rejecting the NFL’s argument that the rule was immune from 
antitrust scrutiny because of the non-statutory labor exemption, 
the district court found that the rule did not concern a mandatory 
subject of bargaining under the National Labor Relations Act 
 
 63.  See Adam Millsap, High school football players should be allowed to 
go pro, TIGER (Nov. 30, 2012), http://www.thetigernews.com/news.php? 
aid=8203&sid=2.  
 64.  See Clarett’s Mot. Summ. J., supra note 40, at 10. 
 65.  See id. at 10 n.23  (“The top 20 rushing leaders after the 5th week of 
the 2003 NFL season, with their height and weight are: (1)  Jamal Lewis, 
5’11”, 240 lbs.; (2)  Stephen Davis, 6’0”, 230 lbs.; (3)  Ahman Green, 6’0”, 217 
lbs.; (4)  Priest Holmes, 5’9”, 213 lbs.; (5)  LaDainian Tomlinson, 5’10”, 221 
lbs.; (6)  Clinton Portis, 5’11”, 205 lbs.; (7)  Deuce McAllister, 6’1”, 221 lbs.; (8)  
Fred Taylor, 6’1”, 234; (9)  Moe Williams, 6’1”, 205 lbs.; (10) Ricky Williams, 
5’10”, 226 lbs.; (11)  Tiki Barber, 5’10”, 200 lbs.; (12)  William Green, 6’0”, 215 
lbs.; (13)  Shaun Alexander, 5’11”, 225 lbs.; (14)  Anthony Thomas, 6’2”, 228 
lbs.; (15)  Troy Hambrick, 6’1”, 233 lbs.; (16)  Garrison Hearst, 5’11”, 215 lbs.; 
(17)  Trung Canidate, 5’11”, 215 lbs.; (18)  Edgerrin James, 6’0”, 214 lbs.; (19)  
Amos Zereoue, 5’8”, 212 lbs.; (20)  Michael Pittman, 6’0”, 218 lbs.”). 
 66.  Id.  
 67.  See Clarett v. NFL, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 379 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 68.  Id. at 382. 
MILSTEINFINALEDITWORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/27/2015  10:24 AM 
2015] A JUSTICE SYSTEM FAILURE 229 
(“NLRA”), restrained only non-employees, and “did not clearly 
result from arm’s length negotiations.”69  Without the shield of the 
labor exemption to protect the rule, the court found the rule to be 
“blatantly anticompetitive”70 and determined that “Clarett ha[d] 
alleged the very type of injury—a complete bar to entry into the 
market for his services—that the antitrust laws are designed to 
prevent.”71  Quoting Learned Hand, the court observed “that the 
antitrust laws will not tolerate a contract ‘which unreasonably 
forbids any one to practice his calling.’”72 
In deciding whether to invoke the exemption, the district 
court used the three-pronged standard set forth by the Eighth 
Circuit in Mackey.73  Because labor law mandates collective 
bargaining only over “wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment,” the district court reasoned, “only 
agreements on these subjects (and intimately related subjects) are 
exempt from the antitrust laws.”74  Inasmuch as mandatory 
subjects of bargaining apply only to employees, the court reasoned 
that the exemption may only be used to shield agreements that 
affect employees who will be bound by those actions.75  Clarett 
and similarly situated athletes were not employees within the 
meaning of the NLRA, nor did the NFLPA represent them in any 
capacity, including collective bargaining, nor were they even 
eligible for employment or inclusion in the collective bargaining 
unit. 
In addressing whether the rule falls within the meaning of 
“wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment” 
under the NLRA, the district court observed that the rule makes 
no reference to wages, hours, or conditions of employment of 
employees or persons eligible for employment.76  Instead, it 
renders a class of otherwise qualified persons who are not 
employees “unemployable.”77  The court thus concluded that the 
NFL’s reliance on three Second Circuit cases, Wood v. National 
 
 69.  Id.  
 70.  Id. at 408. 
 71.  Id. at 382. 
 72.  Id. (quoting Gardella v. Chandler, 172 F.2d 402, 408 (2d Cir.1949)). 
 73.  Id. at 391 (citing Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 614 (8th Cir. 1976)). 
 74.  Id. at 392 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 75.  Id. 
 76.  Id. at 393. 
 77.  Id.  
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Basketball Ass’n,78 National Basketball Ass’n v. Williams,79 and 
Caldwell v. American Basketball Ass’n,80 was misplaced.81  It 
observed that, in sharp contrast to this case, the practices 
challenged in each of those cases involved the wages, hours, or 
working conditions of employees.82  The plaintiffs in Wood and 
Williams were NBA employees who were represented by the 
players’ association, but nevertheless challenged a salary cap 
agreement the league had negotiated with their union.83  The 
plaintiff in Caldwell was a former player challenging his 
discharge.84 
The district court distinguished these three cases, stating: 
In sum, none of the cases cited by the NFL involve job 
eligibility.  The league provisions addressed in Wood, 
Williams, and Caldwell govern the terms by which those 
who are drafted are employed.  The [draft eligibility rule], 
on the other hand, precludes players from entering the 
labor market altogether, and thus affects wages only in 
the sense that a player subject to the Rule will earn none.  
But the Rule itself . . . does not concern wages, hours, or 
conditions of employment and is therefore not covered by 
the non-statutory labor exemption.85 
Having concluded that the rule was not a mandatory subject 
of bargaining, the district court could have ended its analysis.  
Nevertheless, the district court examined the two other Mackey 
factors and found them similarly unavailing.86  First, the court 
found that the rule “only affects players, like Clarett, who are 
complete strangers to the bargaining relationship.”87  In this 
regard, the court stated that “[t]he labor laws cannot be used to 
shield anticompetitive agreements between employers and unions 
that affect only those outside of the bargaining unit.”88  While it is 
 
 78.  809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987). 
 79.  45 F.3d 684 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 80.  66 F.3d 523 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 81.  Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 395. 
 82.  Id. 
 83.  Id. at 393–94. 
 84.  Id. at 394. 
 85.  Id. at 395. 
 86.  Id. at 396–97. 
 87.  Id. at 395. 
 88. Id. (“The labor policy favoring collective bargaining may potentially 
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true that collective bargaining agreements apply to current 
employees as well as those entering the workforce, the district 
court stated that Clarett’s situation was “very different” because 
he was not an employee and, indeed, was not eligible for 
employment.89  The court observed: 
That the non-statutory exemption does not apply in such 
a case is simply the flip side of the rule that the 
exemption only applies to mandatory subjects of collective 
bargaining, those governing wages, hours, and working 
conditions.  Employees who are hired after the collective 
bargaining agreement is negotiated are nonetheless 
bound by its terms because they step into the shoes of the 
players who did engage in collective bargaining.  But 
those who are categorically denied eligibility for 
employment, even temporarily, cannot be bound by the 
terms of employment they cannot obtain.90 
This reasoning is required by longstanding Supreme Court 
precedent on what has evolved into the first prong of the Mackey 
standard.  The agreements at issue in United Mine Workers v. 
Pennington,91 Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3,92 and 
Connell Construction Co., Inc. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 
Union No. 100,93 were all held not to be protected by the non-
statutory labor exemption because, although they directly 
concerned wages, hours, or terms and conditions of employment of 
employees, they sought “to prescribe labor standards outside the 
bargaining unit.”94  Like the small mine operators in Pennington, 
the non-New York City manufacturers in Allen Bradley, and the 
non-union subcontractors in Connell, Clarett and other similarly 
situated athletes, who were strangers to the collective bargaining 
relationship, were the direct and only object of the restraint.95 
 
be given pre-eminence over the antitrust laws where the restraint on trade 
primarily affects only the parties to the collective bargaining relationship.” 
(citing Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 614 (8th Cir. 1976))). 
 89.  Id. 
 90.  Id. at 395–96. 
 91.  381 U.S. 657, 669 (1965). 
 92.  325 U.S. 797, 810 (1945). 
 93.  421 U.S. 616, 622–23 (1975). 
 94.  Pennington, 381 U.S. at 668. 
 95.  Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 395; Connell Const., 421 U.S. at 619; 
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Finally, the district court found that the non-statutory labor 
exemption was inapplicable because “the NFL ha[d] failed to 
demonstrate that the Rule evolved from arm’s-length negotiations 
between the NFL and the NFLPA.”96  The rule, the court 
observed, was adopted more than thirty years before the NFLPA 
was even formed and more than forty years before it became the 
players’ exclusive bargaining agent.97  Indeed, the court found 
that the collective bargaining agreement never mentioned the 
rule.98  While the NFL attempted to rely on the NFLPA’s 
statement that it “waive[s] . . . its rights to bargain over any 
provision of the Constitution and Bylaws . . . [and] to resolve any 
dispute . . . involving the interpretation or application of the 
Constitution and Bylaws in accordance with the dispute resolution 
procedures of the CBA,” the district court read this language only 
to confirm that the NFLPA had merely waived its right to bargain 
and, consequently, that the rule itself “was never the subject of 
collective bargaining between the league and the union, and did 
not arise from the collective bargaining process.”99  Because the 
rule did not evolve from the collective bargaining process, the NFL 
could not shelter its anticompetitive agreement from antitrust 
review.100 
In short, the district court concluded the rule was not within 
the reach of the non-statutory labor exemption for three separate 
reasons, each of which was independently sufficient to foreclose 
the exemption’s applicability.101 
The case should have ended there.  The NFL Combine was 
only three weeks away and the Draft was three months beyond 
that.  Judge Scheindlin called counsel back into her courtroom and 
asked if there was anything else to be done at her level.  She also 
advised the NFL what it already knew: the league had a limited 
period of time to file an appeal before the case became moot—
when Clarett entered the league.  Leaving the courtroom, I 
overheard the NFL’s counsel telling a reporter “this is only the 
 
Pennington, 381 U.S. at 659; Allen Bradley, 325 U.S. at 798.  
 96.  Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 396. 
 97.  Id. 
 98.  Id.  
 99.  Id. (alterations in original) (quoting NFL CBA arts. III, IV, IX) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 100.  Id. at 397. 
 101.  Id. 
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first period.  There are two periods to play.”  While I thought it 
was odd enough for opposing counsel to use a hockey analogy, it 
seemed that he had miscalculated the game clock.  Why would the 
Second Circuit grant expedited review to keep one grown man 
from playing professional football if a team in the league was 
ready to employ him at a substantial salary? 
At a hearing on at least seven other motions for expedited 
review, all of which seemed far more pressing than the Clarett 
case, the Second Circuit denied all but the NFL’s Motion, setting 
what seemed like a frenetic briefing schedule.  Within a week, I 
fielded requests from virtually every professional sports league 
and its union as well as the NCAA, all of whom wanted to file 
amicus briefs on behalf of the NFL.  The only friend of the court 
Clarett enjoyed was Representative John L. Conyers, Jr., of the 
Committee on the Judiciary United States House of 
Representatives, the Congressional committee charged with 
overseeing the antitrust laws of the United States.102  
Representative Conyers wrote: 
As the Ranking Democrat on the House Judiciary 
Committee, amicus has an overriding interest in 
preserving and protecting the antitrust laws.  Amicus is 
concerned that the non-statutory labor exemption not be 
extended in a manner that would undermine the integrity 
of the antitrust laws or intrude on Congress’ traditional 
purview in enacting such laws.  In addition, amicus 
believes that Clarett, who has been foreclosed from being 
able to seek employment in the NFL, is precisely the type 
of party Congress envisioned being able to seek relief 
under the antitrust laws.103 
At the oral argument in Foley Square, in a courtroom that 
prominently displayed a bust of Learned Hand, reporters filled the 
seats.  From the beginning it seemed clear that the court, with 
Judge Sonia Sotomayor leading the charge, wanted to reverse.  
While one normally waits weeks or longer for a decision, the clerk 
called my cell phone within an hour of the argument stating we 
had lost. 
 
 102.  See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 27, Clarett v. NFL, 369 F.3d 124 
(2d Cir. 2004) (No. 04-910), 2004 WL 3057836 (U.S.). 
 103.  Id. at 27–28 (quoting Rep. John L. Conyers, Mich.).  
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In reversing the district court, the Second Circuit expressly 
rejected the Mackey standard.104  The Second Circuit rejected 
each of the district court’s conclusions and found the rule immune 
from antitrust challenges under the non-statutory labor 
exemption because it was imposed “on a labor market organized 
around a collective bargaining relationship.”105  Under the Second 
Circuit’s curious standard, all anticompetitive agreements among 
employers who collectively bargain on a multi-employer basis are 
exempt from antitrust review if the restraint is upon a “labor” 
market.  Indeed, under the Second Circuit’s holding, it is 
immaterial whether the matter involves a mandatory subject of 
bargaining, restrains only strangers to the collective bargaining 
relationship, or has even been collectively bargained for at all.  
Rather, the mere presence of a union shelters all “labor” market 
restraints.  This standard deviated far from the holdings of other 
circuits as well as the holdings of the Supreme Court.  It is simply 
wrong. 
In Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen 
v. Jewel Tea Co., a companion case to Pennington, the Supreme 
Court reached a different result.106  There, a multi-employer 
group of grocery stores agreed with the union representing its 
butchers to limit the operation of meat counters to certain 
hours.107  Jewel Tea, one of the stores that was a signatory to the 
agreement, challenged the hours restriction on antitrust 
grounds.108  Justices White and Goldberg, writing collectively for 
six Justices, concluded that, for the non-statutory labor exemption 
to be available, the labor-management agreement at issue must be 
both a mandatory subject of bargaining and the product of “bona 
fide, arm’s-length bargaining.”109  These two criteria represent the 
second and third elements of the Mackey standard.  The Second 
Circuit, however, read Jewel Tea to mean that only “product” 
market restraints are outside the reach of the exemption, a 
reading wholly without justification.110  Nowhere in Jewel Tea did 
 
 104.  Clarett v. NFL, 369 F.3d 124, 133 (2d Cir. 2004).  
 105.  Id. at 134. 
 106.  381 U.S. 676 (1965). 
 107.  Id. at 679–80. 
 108.  Id. at 681. 
 109.  Id. at 689–90. 
 110.  See Clarett, 369 F.3d at 132–34.  
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the Supreme Court state that only restraints on the “product” 
market were outside the reach of the exemption or that restraints 
on the labor market were automatically insulated.111  Indeed, 
under the Second Circuit’s holding, the many cases in which 
player restraints have been challenged in situations when the 
players were contemporaneously represented by a union that 
negotiated on their behalf with teams that bargained on a multi-
employer basis must have been wrongly reasoned.112  After all, 
under the Second Circuit’s paradigm, the antitrust laws have no 
applicability whatsoever and are, in effect, extinguished under 
such circumstances. 
In Connell, a union demanded that a contractor do business 
only with subcontractors employing union members, despite the 
fact that the union did not represent the contractor’s employees, 
and the agreement sought was not a collective bargaining 
contract.113  The contractor, who acquiesced in the demand only 
after the union picketed one of its sites, challenged the 
arrangement on antitrust grounds.114  The Supreme Court again 
denied antitrust immunity to this “kind of direct restraint on the 
business market [that] has substantial anticompetitive effects, 
both actual and potential, that would not follow naturally from the 
elimination of competition over wages and working conditions.”115 
The Second Circuit again misapplied precedent, misreading 
Connell to mean that only “product” market restraints fall outside 
the non-statutory labor exemption.116  Connell stands for nothing 
 
 111.  In Jewel Tea, Justice White stated that application of the 
nonstatutory labor exemption required balancing “the interests of union 
members served by the restraint against its relative impact on the product 
market.” 381 U.S. at 690 n.5.  This formula, however, was designed to weigh 
the competing antitrust and labor law considerations at stake, not to 
establish that all labor market restraints fall automatically within the 
exemption, as the Second Circuit decided. 
 112.  See, e.g., Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 231 (1996); 
McCourt v. Cal. Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193, 1197–98 (6th Cir. 1979); Mackey 
v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 614 (8th Cir. 1976); cf. generally Boris v. U.S. Football 
League, Civ. A. No. 83-4980 LEW, 1984 WL 894 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 1984); 
Linseman v. World Hockey Ass’n, 439 F. Supp. 1315 (D. Conn. 1977); Denver 
Rockets v. All-Pro Mgmt., Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971). 
 113.  421 U.S. 616, 619–20 (1975). 
 114.  Id. 
 115.  Id. at 625. 
 116.  See Clarett v. NFL, 369 F.3d 124, 134 (2d Cir. 2004). 
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of the sort.  Nowhere in Connell did the Supreme Court limit its 
holding to “product” market restraints.  In fact, Connell supports 
the conclusion, also present in Allen Bradley and Pennington, that 
it is the exclusion of strangers to the collective bargaining 
relationship that rendered the agreement subject to antitrust 
scrutiny.117  Clarett was no different than the subcontractors in 
Connell.  He was an “economic actor” barred from selling his 
talent in the market for player services.  Moreover, as in Connell, 
the union did not represent him.118 
Indeed, the Second Circuit’s effort to distinguish “product” 
markets from “labor” markets was illusory and flew in the face of 
Supreme Court precedent.  So-called “product” and “labor” 
markets are so intertwined and interconnected that they cannot 
be distinguished from one another.  For example, in Connell, the 
agreement in question not only restrained prospective 
subcontractors who could have bid upon jobs but for the 
restriction, but also excluded employees of those employers who 
were likewise foreclosed from employment opportunities.119  In 
addition, in Jewel Tea, the restraint involved the store’s 
marketing hours.120  Nevertheless, Justice White found the 
restriction “so intimately related to wages, hours and working 
conditions that the unions’ successful attempt to obtain that 
provision through bona fide, arm’s length bargaining” was “within 
the protection of national labor policy and . . . therefore exempt 
from the Sherman Act.”121 
The Second Circuit flatly rejected the district court’s reliance 
on the standard announced in Mackey, stating that it had “never 
regarded the Eighth Circuit’s test in Mackey as defining the 
appropriate limits of the non-statutory exemption.”122  The court 
 
 117.  Connell Constr., 421 U.S. at 625; United Mine Workers of Am. v. 
Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 668 (1965); Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, 
Int’l Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 325 U.S. 797, 810 (1945). 
 118.  Clarett, 369 F.3d at 126; see also Connell Constr., 421 U.S. at 619. 
 119.  421 U.S. at 618–19. 
 120.  381 U.S. 676, 679–80 (1965). 
 121.  Id. at 689–90.  See also BERNARD D. MELTZER, LABOR LAW 496 (1970) 
(“The impact of wage costs on supply and price results in an inextricable 
connection between the two markets.  As a result, the general objectives of 
the Sherman Act . . . can be frustrated by monopoly power exerted solely in 
the labor market.”)   
 122.  Clarett, 369 F.3d at 133. 
MILSTEINFINALEDITWORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/27/2015  10:24 AM 
2015] A JUSTICE SYSTEM FAILURE 237 
stated, 
we disagree with the Eighth Circuit’s assumption in 
Mackey that the Supreme Court’s decisions in Connell, 
Jewel Tea, Pennington, and Allen Bradley dictate the 
appropriate boundaries of the non-statutory exemption 
for cases in which the only alleged anticompetitive effect 
of the challenged restraint is on a labor market organized 
around a collective bargaining relationship.123 
Thus, the Second Circuit plainly acknowledged that its 
decision created a split among the circuits on the critically 
important parameters of the exemption.  Its holding directly and 
unabashedly contravened the decisions of the Eighth Circuit in 
Mackey,124 the Sixth Circuit in McCourt,125 and the Ninth Circuit 
in Continental Maritime of San Francisco, Inc. v. Pacific Coast 
Metal Trades District Council126 that the antitrust laws apply 
fully to anticompetitive agreements affecting the labor market in 
the context of a multi-employer collective bargaining situation.  
While these courts, consistent with the district court’s sound 
reasoning, would not allow the exemption automatically to shield 
plainly anticompetitive conduct that restrains the rights of 
prospective employees to practice their trade, the Second Circuit 
would invoke the exemption in every case unless it was 
“employers who asserted that they were being excluded from 
competition in the product market.”127 
The Second Circuit claimed to find further support for its 
approach in the Supreme Court’s pronouncement on the reach of 
the non-statutory labor exemption in Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., a 
case establishing the duration of the exemption.128  As if it meant 
something, the Second Circuit announced that “eight Justices 
[had] agreed that the non-statutory exemption precludes antitrust 
claims against a professional sports league for unilaterally setting 
policy with respect to mandatory bargaining subjects after 
negotiations with the players union over those subjects reach 
 
 123.  Id. at 133–34 
 124.  Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 623 (8th Cir. 1976). 
 125.  600 F.2d at 1193, 1215 (6th Cir. 1979).  
 126.  817 F.2d 1391, 1394–95 (9th Cir. 1987).  
 127.  Clarett, 369 F.3d at 134. 
 128.  518 U.S. 231, 244 (1966). 
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impasse.”129 
But the Clarett case, of course, did not involve the duration of 
the exemption.  More importantly, the plaintiff in Brown was an 
NFL employee and a member of the union.130  Clarett was 
neither.  He was instead a stranger to the bargaining relationship 
because he was excluded from the league.  Moreover, the subject 
at issue in Brown was wages—an unquestionably mandatory 
subject of bargaining—while the subject in Clarett—an 
employment eligibility rule—was not a mandatory subject of 
bargaining.131  The subject at issue in Brown was bargained over 
extensively, indeed exhaustively, as demonstrated by the fact that 
the parties reached impasse as to that issue, while in Clarett, no 
bargaining at all took place over the rule.132 
In Brown, the Supreme Court noted that the NFL conduct at 
issue, 
took place during and immediately after a collective-
bargaining negotiation.  It grew out of, and was directly 
related to, the lawful operation of the bargaining process.  
It involved a matter that the parties were required to 
negotiate collectively.  And it concerned only the parties 
to the collective-bargaining relationship.133 
Thus, the Brown decision is grounded on the very three factors 
relied upon by the Eighth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits but rejected 
by the Second Circuit. 
The Second Circuit not only misused Brown to extend the 
exemption far beyond what Brown or any other case would 
sanction, it did so in defiance of the Supreme Court’s clear 
instruction to the contrary.  Indeed, the Second Circuit 
acknowledged that the Court in Brown had “expressed some 
reservations about . . . the broader holding of the court of appeals 
that the non-statutory exemption ‘waiv[es] antitrust liability for 
restraints on competition imposed through the collective-
bargaining process so long as such restraints operate primarily in 
 
 129.  Clarett, 369 F.3d at 137. 
 130.  Brown, 518 U.S. at 233–34. 
 131.  Id.; see also Clarett, 369 F.3d at 139.  
 132.  Clarett, 369 F.3d at 139; Brown, 518 U.S. at 233–34.  
 133.  Brown, 518 U.S. at 250. 
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a labor market characterized by collective bargaining.’”134  But the 
Supreme Court expressed far more than “reservations” about an 
expansive interpretation of the non-statutory labor exemption.  In 
Brown, it wrote, “we do not interpret the exemption as broadly as 
did the Appeals Court.”135 
The Second Circuit rejected Clarett’s contention, and the 
district court’s finding, that the rule is not a mandatory subject of 
bargaining under the NLRA.136  The court wrote that “the 
eligibility rules for the draft represent a quite literal condition for 
initial employment and for that reason alone might constitute a 
mandatory bargaining subject.”137  For this proposition, the 
appellate court quoted Professor Gorman’s treatise Labor Law, 
which states, “[i]n accordance with the literal language of the 
Labor Act, the parties must bargain about the requirements or 
‘conditions’ of initial employment.”138  This reference, however, 
has nothing to do with employment eligibility, but only with the 
initial terms and conditions of work for employees once they are 
hired.  “Conditions of employment” mean working conditions like 
hours, facilities, or uniforms, not the conditions one must meet to 
be hired.  In addition, the Second Circuit stated, “eligibility rules 
constitute a mandatory bargaining subject because they have 
tangible effects on the wages and working conditions of current 
NFL players” and “affect the job security of veteran players.”139  
This conclusion, aside from being factually wrong,140 is contrary to 
Supreme Court and National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) 
precedent on this issue.141 
 
 134.  Clarett, 369 F.3d at 138 (quoting Brown, 518 U.S. at 235). 
 135.  518 U.S. at 235. 
 136.  Clarett, 369 F.3d at 142.  
 137.  Id. at 139. 
 138.  Id. at 140 (quoting R. GORMAN, LABOR LAW, UNIONIZATION, AND 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 504 (1976)). 
 139.  Id. 
 140.  Clarett’s eligibility for the draft would have had no effect at all on a 
veteran player’s interest in job preservation because Clarett would simply 
have taken the place of the last player chosen in the draft.  The last player 
drafted is traditionally known as “Mr. Irrelevant.”  See McCann, supra note 
4, at 912. 
 141.  See, e.g., Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers of Am., Local Union No. 1 v. 
Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., Chem. Div., 404 U.S. 157 (1971); Johnson-
Bateman Co., 295 N.L.R.B. 180 (1989); Star Tribune, 295 N.L.R.B. 543 
(1989). 
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The NLRA protects “employees” and, only under rare 
circumstances that are not present here, non-employees.142  Thus, 
the heart of that NLRA, section 7, states that “employees shall 
have the right of self-organization, to form, join or assist labor 
organizations for the purpose of collective bargaining or other 
mutual aid or protection.”143  This language is natural, of course, 
because the purpose of the NLRA was to grant employees the 
right to form unions and to bargain collectively, rather than 
individually.  Because the NLRA grants rights to employees, labor 
and management must bargain only over the “wages, hours and 
other terms and conditions of employment” of current employees, 
not applicants for employment like Clarett or retirees.144 
The Supreme Court and the NLRB have long held that 
matters exclusively concerning job applicants or former employees 
do not constitute mandatory subjects of bargaining.145  For 
example, in Star Tribune and The Newspaper Guild of the Twin 
Cities,  the NLRB addressed the question of whether drug testing 
for employment applicants was a mandatory subject of bargaining 
under the NLRA.146  There, the NLRB unambiguously declared 
that “[a]pplicants . . . are not ‘employees’ under the Act” and that, 
therefore, the issue was not a mandatory subject of bargaining 
under the NLRA.147  As a consequence, the employer could 
unilaterally require job applicants to undergo drug screening and 
was not obligated to bargain with the union representing its 
current employees regarding that matter.148 
The significance of Star Tribune is illuminated by its 
companion case, Johnson-Bateman Co. and International Ass’n of 
Machinists.149  There, the NLRB held that mandatory drug 
testing for current employees was a mandatory subject of 
bargaining, and thus, the employer’s unilateral adoption of such 
 
 142.  See 29 U.S.C. § 152 (2012). 
 143.  29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012).   
 144.  See 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2006). 
 145.  See, e.g., Pittsburgh Plate Glass, 404 U.S. 157; Johnson-Bateman, 
295 N.L.R.B. 180; Star Tribune, 295 N.L.R.B 543. 
 146.  295 N.L.R.B. 543. 
 147.  Id. at 557. 
 148.  Id.  See also NLRB v. USPS, 18 F.3d 1089, 1098 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(holding that an employer generally has no duty to bargain over practices 
that involve non-unit employees). 
 149.  295 N.L.R.B. 180. 
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testing for current employees was a breach of its duty to bargain 
with the union in good faith over the “wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment” of its employees under the 
NLRA.150  These two cases, read collectively, clearly confirm that 
mandatory subjects of bargaining involve the wages, hours, and 
terms and conditions of employment of current employees, not 
prospective employees. 
Finally, in Allied Chemical & Alkali Workers, Local 1 v. 
Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., the Supreme Court established the 
parameters of the bargaining obligation under the NLRA.151  
There, the question was whether the company was obligated to 
bargain with its employees’ union over retirement benefits, 
including health insurance, for retirees.152  The Supreme Court’s 
decision provided: 
Together, [Sections 1, 8(a)(5), 8(d) and 9(a)] establish the 
obligation of the employer to bargain collectively, ‘with 
respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions 
of employment,’ with ‘the representatives of his 
employees’ designated or selected by the majority ‘in a 
unit appropriate for such purposes.’  This obligation 
extends only to the ‘terms and conditions of employment’ 
of the employer’s ‘employees’ in the ‘unit appropriate for 
such purposes’ that the union represents.153 
In addition, the Supreme Court separately put to rest any 
argument that employers were obligated to bargain with the 
union representing their employees over persons who were not 
employed.  The Supreme Court held: 
Section 9(a) of the [NLRA] accords representative status 
only to the labor organization selected or designated by 
the majority of employees in a ‘unit appropriate’ ‘for the 
purposes of collective bargaining.’ . . . In this cause, in 
addition to holding that pensioners are not ‘employees’ 
within the meaning of the collective-bargaining 
obligations of the Act, we hold that they were not and 
 
 150.  Id. at 181, 188.   
 151.  404 U. S. 157 (1971). 
 152.  Id. at 158. 
 153.  Id. at 164.   
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could not be ‘employees’ included in the bargaining 
unit.154 
The Second Circuit’s decision contravenes Star Tribune, 
Johnson-Bateman, and Pittsburgh Plate Glass.  Those cases 
illuminate the bright line drawn between those persons who are 
employed and those who are either not yet employed or have 
ceased employment.  The former may exercise and enjoy the rights 
and protections of the NLRA, while the latter may not.  
Mandatory subjects of bargaining do not include matters 
applicable only to non-employees, like Clarett, any more than they 
did to the prospective employees in Star Tribune or the retirees in 
Pittsburgh Plate Glass.  Like all other employers in the United 
States, the NFL has no duty to bargain with the NFLPA 
regarding employment eligibility rules for prospective 
employees.155  Such persons are not “employees” within the 
meaning of the NLRA and are plainly not members of the 
collective bargaining unit.156  Therefore, the employer’s 
bargaining obligation does not extend to matters affecting only 
them and questions concerning their eligibility for employment 
are not, and cannot be, mandatory subjects of bargaining under 
the NLRA. 
To be sure, there are rare circumstances where rules affecting 
non-employees may be deemed to “vitally affect” the terms and 
conditions of employment of current employees and, therefore, fall 
within the mandatory bargaining requirement.157  At the same 
time, however, “[a]n indirect or incidental impact on unit 
employees is not sufficient to establish a matter as a mandatory 
subject.  Rather, mandatory subjects include only those matters 
that materially or significantly affect unit employees’ terms and 
conditions of employment.”158  No such vital effects were 
demonstrated in Clarett. 
Of course eligibility rules, depending on their terms, may 
lessen a veteran player’s risk of being replaced by an entering 
player, but this is always true in any employment setting because 
 
 154.  Id. at 171–72.   
 155.  See Clarett v. NFL, 369 F.3d 124, 141 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 156.  See 29 U.S.C § 152 (2012). 
 157.  See, e.g., United Techs. Corp., 274 N.L.R.B. 1069, 1070 (1985), 
enforced, 789 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1986). 
 158.  Id. 
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limiting access to employment will always result in greater job 
security for incumbent employees.  Such effect alone does not, and 
cannot, convert employment eligibility rules into mandatory 
subjects of bargaining, or the exception would wholly swallow the 
rule and, contrary to Star Tribune, render eligibility rules 
mandatory subjects of bargaining under all circumstances.  Like 
eligibility rules for prospective employees, retiree benefits may 
also have a substantial impact on terms and conditions for current 
employees, but that effect, of course, did not make such benefits a 
mandatory subject of bargaining in Pittsburgh Plate Glass.159  By 
expanding the duty to bargain to include employment eligibility 
rules, the Second Circuit’s opinion fundamentally alters the 
balance of power between employers and unions and broadens the 
bargaining obligation beyond anything envisioned by Congress, 
the Supreme Court, or the NLRB. 
In any event, Clarett’s eligibility would have had no effect 
whatsoever on the jobs of veteran players or their wages, let alone 
a “vital effect.”  The number of rounds in the NFL draft is limited 
to seven.  Roughly 214 new players were drafted in the 2004 
draft.160  Clarett’s eligibility in that draft would have had no effect 
at all on a veteran player’s interest in job preservation, because 
Clarett would simply have taken the place of the last player 
chosen in the draft.  Put differently, regardless of whether Clarett 
participated in the 2004 draft, the total number of new players 
eligible was fixed.  Thus, Clarett’s participation, or lack thereof, 
would not affect the job security of players already in the league, 
only the identity of the new players entering the league. 
The Second Circuit asserted that Clarett “argues that the 
eligibility rules are an impermissible bargaining subject because 
they affect players outside of the union.”161  Not true.  Clarett had 
never taken this position.  Quite to the contrary, Clarett argued 
that eligibility rules are a permissive subject of bargaining.162  
They are not “wages, hours, or other terms and conditions of 
employment” for employees and, therefore, mandatory subjects of 
 
 159.  404 U.S. at 157. 
 160.  See Draft Season 2004, NFL, http://www.nfl.com/draft/history/ 
fulldraft?season=2004 (last visited Dec. 30, 2014). 
 161.  Clarett v. NFL, 369 F.3d 124, 140 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 162.  Clarrett v. NFL, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 390, 400 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
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bargaining, but neither are they unlawful.163  The distinction was 
critical.  While it was true that the draft profoundly affects 
players entering the unit by limiting the teams with which they 
may negotiate, the draft eligibility rule foreclosed any employment 
opportunity for a class of otherwise qualified applicants.  Clarett 
never challenged the validity of the draft mechanism as a lawful 
and, indeed, mandatory subject of bargaining. He sought only to 
be part of that mechanism. 
The Second Circuit cited the hiring hall arrangement in 
certain industries as authority for the proposition that 
employment eligibility rules are mandatory subjects of 
bargaining.164  This analogy highlights a fundamental flaw in the 
court’s reasoning.  Hiring halls exist “in certain industries—most 
notably maritime, longshoring and construction” where the 
“unions provide what is in effect a job-referral service and act as a 
clearinghouse between employees seeking work and employers 
seeking workers.”165 
The NFLPA does not operate a hiring hall.  It does not refer 
players for employment to NFL teams needing a player with 
particular skills for short-term employment.  Put differently, the 
particular needs of employers, employees, and unions, which make 
hiring halls necessary in certain industries, have no bearing on 
the NFL and, while such arrangements constitute mandatory 
subjects of bargaining in those settings, nothing in the Clarett 
case suggested that an employment eligibility rule that excludes 
an otherwise qualified class of prospective employees is likewise 
mandatory.  Instead, in this setting, like the vast majority of 
employment settings, the reach of the union’s bargaining 
authority is coextensive with the collective bargaining unit and 
did not include persons like Clarett who were neither employees, 
members of the union, or part of the collective bargaining unit. 
Indeed, in Pittsburgh Plate Glass, the Supreme Court 
foreshadowed and rejected, this very argument advanced by the 
NFL and accepted by the Second Circuit.166  Rejecting the hiring 
hall analogy, the Supreme Court wrote, 
 
 163.  Id. 
 164.  Clarett, 369 F.3d at 140–41. 
 165.  ARCHIBALD COX ET AL., LABOR LAW 1125 (13th ed. 2001). 
 166.  404 U.S. 157, 168 (1971). 
MILSTEINFINALEDITWORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/27/2015  10:24 AM 
2015] A JUSTICE SYSTEM FAILURE 245 
[t]he Board enumerated ‘unfair labor practice situations 
where the statute has been applied to persons who have 
not been initially hired by an employer or whose 
employment has terminated.  Illustrative are cases in 
which the Board has held that applicants for employment 
and registrants at hiring halls—who have never been 
hired in the first place—as well as persons who have quit 
or whose employers have gone out of business are 
‘employees’ embraced by the policies of the Act.’ . . . Yet 
all of these cases involved people who, unlike the 
pensioners here, were members of the active work force 
available for hire and at least in that sense could be 
identified as ‘employees.’  No decision under the Act is 
cited, and none to our knowledge exists, in which an 
individual who has ceased work without expectation of 
further employment has been held to be an ‘employee.’167 
So, too, a person not eligible for employment, like Clarett, was not 
an employee within the meaning of the NLRA. 
The Second Circuit also noted that the NFL teams bargain 
with the NFLPA on a multi-employer basis, an entirely 
permissible arrangement under the NLRA, as support for its 
conclusion that Clarett’s position would undermine federal labor 
policy.168  This fact, however, has no bearing upon the question 
whether an agreement among such employers and the union 
representing their employees is immune from antitrust scrutiny 
under the non-statutory labor exemption.  After all, Allen Bradley 
and Pennington both involved circumstances in which a group of 
employers, bargaining on a multi-employer basis, had reached 
anticompetitive arrangements with the unions representing their 
employees, and, nevertheless, the Supreme Court reached the 
question of antitrust liability and found such liability.169  Clarett 
did not challenge the multi-employer bargaining arrangement in 
professional football.  The decision of the NFL and the NFLPA to 
bargain on that basis, however, should not have served to insulate 
 
 167.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 168.  Clarett, 369 F.3d at 143. 
 169. Allen Bradly Co. v. Local Union No. 3, Int’l Brotherhood of Electrical 
Workers, 325 U.S. 797, 798 (1945); United Mine Workers of Am. v. 
Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 668 (1935). 
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their anticompetitive conduct unless the other factors warranting 
such immunity were present.  Not one of the factors supporting 
immunity were present. 
Despite the fact that the rule appeared nowhere in the CBA, 
the Second Circuit concluded that the draft eligibility rule was 
“well known to the union, and a copy of the Constitution and 
Bylaws was presented to the union during negotiations.”170  Thus, 
the court reasoned, “the union or the NFL could have forced the 
other to the bargaining table if either felt that a change was 
warranted.”171  First, this conclusion flowed only from the Second 
Circuit’s erroneous holding that employment eligibility rules were 
mandatory subjects of bargaining and that management was 
obligated to bargain with the union representing its employees 
regarding the qualifications of the persons it seeks to employ.172  
They are not mandatory subjects of bargaining, and management 
is not so obligated.  Moreover, even if such eligibility rules were 
mandatory subjects of bargaining, the court’s holding that the 
conduct of the NFL and the NFLPA amounted to the level of 
arm’s-length collective bargaining necessary to shelter an 
anticompetitive agreement conflicted with the decisions of every 
Circuit that had considered the issue.173 
The correct standard is clear: there must be substantial 
evidence that “the parties bargained extensively over the [Rule] 
and that the [NFLPA] representatives concluded that it was in the 
best interest of the membership to agree to the [Rule] based on the 
concessions received from the NFL.”174  In McCourt, as in 
Zimmerman v. National Football League,175 the courts applied the 
exemption because actual bargaining had taken place over the 
restraint at issue.176  In Robertson v. National Basketball League, 
as in Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey 
 
 170.  Clarett, 369 F.3d at 142. 
 171.  Id. 
 172.  Id. 
 173.  See, e.g., McCourt v. Cal. Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193, 1203 (6th Cir. 
1979); Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 623 (8th Cir. 1976); Zimmerman v. 
NFL, 632 F. Supp. 398, 406 (D.D.C. 1986); Robertson v. NBA, 389 F. Supp. 
867, 895 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Phila. World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Phila Hockey 
Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462, 499 (E.D. Penn. 1972). 
 174.  See McCourt, 600 F.2d at 1203; Zimmerman, 632 F. Supp. at 406. 
 175.  632 F. Supp. at 406. 
 176.  600 F.2d at 1203. 
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Club, Inc.,177 the courts withheld the exemption based upon the 
absence of “[s]erious, intensive, arms-length collective 
bargaining.”178  In Zimmerman, the court focused on the details of 
the exchanges between the parties, and, in McCourt, the court 
concluded that the union had “bargained . . . vigorously,” against 
the restraint at issue.179 
In Mackey, on the other hand, no such bargaining took 
place.180  The restraint under scrutiny, the so-called “Rozelle 
Rule,” had been incorporated by reference into the collective 
bargaining contract between the NFL and the NFLPA, and the 
NFL argued that this incorporation immunized the restraint from 
antitrust scrutiny.181  The Eighth Circuit disagreed, however, 
finding that the rule was not the product of “bona fide arm’s 
length bargaining.”182  The court reviewed the bargaining history 
and affirmed the district court’s finding that the union had 
received no quid pro quo for the rule’s inclusion in the collective 
bargaining contract.183 
At bottom, the naked restraint in Clarett fell squarely within 
the view of bargaining set forth in Mackey and its progeny.  
Indeed, there was no bargaining whatsoever over the rule, while 
in those cases the bargaining was merely inadequate.184  For this 
reason, the district court properly observed that the record “is 
peculiarly sparse in establishing the evolution of the rule.  Indeed, 
what the record omits speaks louder than what it contains.”185  
The court thus determined that the rule was not the product of 
arm’s-length collective bargaining.186  On the same record, the 
Second Circuit held this evidence sufficient under Jewel Tea to 
 
 177.  351 F. Supp. at 499. 
 178.  389 F. Supp. at 895 (quoting Phila. World Hockey Club, 351 F. Supp. 
at 499). 
 179.  McCourt, 600 F.2d at 1203–04; Zimmerman, 632 F. Supp. at 401–03. 
 180.  Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 623 (8th Cir. 1976). 
 181.  Id.  
 182.  Id. at 616.   
 183.  Id. at 623.  The court further held that “[t]he union’s acceptance of 
the status quo by the continuance of the Rozelle Rule in the initial collective 
bargaining agreements . . . [could not] serve to immunize the Rozelle Rule 
from the scrutiny of the Sherman Act.”  Id. at 616.   
 184.  Clarett v. NFL, 369 F.3d 124, 128–29 (2d Cir. 2004) (discussing the 
history of the rule created by the Commissioner pursuant to his authority).  
 185.  Clarett v. NFL, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 186.  Id. 
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invoke the exemption, virtually eliminating any requirement that 
the challenged agreement be the product of bona fide arm’s-length 
bargaining.187  By eliminating actual bargaining as a requirement 
for invocation of the exemption, the Second Circuit again parted 
ways and created a split in the circuits as to the role of actual 
bargaining in the invocation of the exemption. 
The Second Circuit’s decision as to the reach of the non-
statutory labor exemption was breathtaking.  It permitted any 
and all anticompetitive agreements among employers restraining 
trade in the market for labor, so long as their employees are 
represented by a union with which they collectively bargain on a 
multi-employer basis.188  Indeed, under the Second Circuit’s 
analysis, it would be immaterial whether or not the agreement 
involved a mandatory subject of bargaining, primarily affected 
only strangers to the collective bargaining arrangement, or was 
unilaterally imposed by the employers and not the product of 
arm’s-length collective bargaining.  The mere presence of a union, 
coupled with a multi-employer bargaining arrangement, would 
shelter any anticompetitive arrangements regarding labor.  
Nothing in any area of U.S. law suggests that policies underlying 
labor law warrant such a sweeping repeal of the antitrust laws. 
As the above analysis of the Second Court’s decision suggests, 
age eligibility rules in professional sports can still be challenged 
after Clarett, particularly the absurd “one and done” rule in 
basketball.  Such a challenge, however, is best to be filed in a 
circuit where Mackey, a case brought by that great tight end from 
my beloved Baltimore Colts, still roams the field.189 
For Clarett, the Second Circuit decision meant that he would 
sit out a second season without playing football, a lifetime for an 
athlete.  He spent that year lamenting his fate and drinking 
heavily.  When he showed up for the NFL Combine in February 
2005, he was noticeably out of shape and out of sorts.  In April, the 
Denver Broncos reluctantly selected him in the third round of the 
NFL Draft.190  His preseason camp was a disaster, and he was cut 
 
 187.  Clarett, 369 F.3d at 133–34. 
 188.  Id. 
 189.  For an excellent analysis of a prospective NBA player challenging 
the NBA’s eligibility rule in a post-Clarett world, see McCann, supra note 4, 
at 914–19. 
 190.  Draft Season 2004, supra note 160.   
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from the roster without ever playing a down in the NFL.191 
After that, Clarett continued to descend.  By the fall of 2006, 
after two run-ins with the law, he hit rock bottom. Sentenced to 
seven-and-a-half years in an Ohio state prison, Clarett ended up 
in the place he had sworn he would avoid.192  It was a place from 
which football should have provided an escape and would have if 
the NCAA had not provided Geiger with the opportunity to ban 
Clarett from college football. 
Fortunately, Clarett was granted early release from prison 
after three-and-a-half years.193  He is trying to get his life back 
together and to make sense of his past.  In a recent documentary 
on Clarett, Judge Scheindlin commented on the life that could 
have been but was wasted.194  “The justice system failed Maurice 
Clarett,” she said, a remarkable admission by a sitting district 
judge about an appellate court which reversed her.195 
 
 
 191.  See Joe Drape, Gamble on Clarett Reveals Perils of Potential, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 31, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/31/sports/football/ 
31clarett.html?_r=0. 
 192.  See Bruce Cadwallader, Clarett seeks early release from prision, 
COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Feb. 10, 2010, 5:19 AM), http://www.dispatch.com/ 
content/stories/sports/2010/02/10/clarett.ART_ART_02-10-
10_C6_N5GI4JI.html.  
 193.  See Shalise Manza Young, Timely warning for NFL rookies, BOS. 
GLOBE (June 28, 2013), available at http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P2-
34833056.html.  
 194.  Transcript: Youngstown Boys (ESPN television broadcast Dec. 15, 
2013) (on file with author). 
 195.  Id. 
